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COMMENTS
DNA PATENTABILITY: SHUTTING THE
DOOR TO THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT
DONALD L. ZUHN, JR.
Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of
natural right, but for the benefit of society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which
are not.'
Thomas Jefferson, 1813
INTRODUCTION

"Achieving the ultimate goal of a patent," wrote Judge Giles
S. Rich,' "involves, to use an analogy, having the separate keys to
open insuccession the three doors of [35 U.S.C.3 ] sections 101, 102,
and 103."' Thus, to secure patent protection for an invention, an
inventor must first establish, under section 101, that the invention
J.D. Candidate, 2002, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago; Ph.D.,
University of Illinois at Chicago, 1996; B.S., Loyola University of Chicago,
1984. Admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 2001. The author gratefully acknowledges Dr. Michael S. Greenfield,
Esq. and Dr. Aaron Barkoff for their critical review of this Comment. The author would also like to thank Dr. Kevin E. Noonan, Esq. for his guidance and
discussions regarding this Comment. Any errors, omissions, or misstatements, however, should be attributed to the author alone.
1. 13 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905).
2. Giles Sutherland Rich (1904-1999) was the oldest active federal judge in
U.S. history. Patent and Trademark Office Mourns Death of Judge Giles S.
Rich
(last
modified
July
1,
1999)
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/99-14.htm.
Upon his death in
1999, Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Q. Todd Dickinson,
called Judge Rich "the single most important figure in twentieth century intellectual property law," and noted that "[h]is life's work will illuminate the
American patent system for decades to come." Id.
3. Title 35 concerns the establishment of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, the requirements for patentability, the grant of patents,
and the protection of patent rights. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-318 (2000).
4. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), affd sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
*
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falls within one of the statutory categories and that the invention
is "useful."6 After the inventor satisfies the requirements of section 101, "he is allowed to pass through to the second door, which
is [section] 102." 7 Here, the inventor must establish that the invention is novel.' The third "door" is section 103, where the inventor must establish that the invention is non-obvious.9 Only after
the inventor has satisfied the requirements of all three sections securing the "key" to each of the "doors of sections 101, 102, and
103" - will the inventor be permitted to secure a patent for an invention.'°
In describing the significance of the first "door," Justice Fortas wrote that "It]he basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress 1 for granting a patent monopoly [to an
inventor] is the benefit derived by the public from an invention
with substantial utility."' In the years since Justice Fortas wrote
of this "basic quid pro quo," the "door" to section 101 has been, in
effect, propped open by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("USPTO") and the federal courts, and inventors have been
allowed to pass through this "door" with relative ease. 13 The re-

5. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). For an invention to be patentable, it must be
directed to a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or... improvement thereof." Id.
6. Id. For an invention to be patentable, it must be "useful." Id.
7. Bergy, 596 F.2d at 960.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). For an invention to be patentable, it must be
novel; for example, the invention must not have been "known or used by others
in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant." Id.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). For an invention to be patentable, it must be
non-obvious, that is, "the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art [must not be] such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." Id.
10. Bergy, 596 F.2d at 962 (stating that "[i]f the inventor holds the three
different keys to the three doors, his invention... qualifies for a patent, otherwise not").
11. The grant of power to Congress to establish the patent system is derived from Article I, Section 8, Clauses 8 and 18 of the U.S. Constitution:
The Congress shall have the Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;... And To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (holding that an invention possesses "substantial utility" when it has specific benefit in its currently
available form).
13. See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d
1247, 1260 (1980) (holding that an inventor need only establish "[a] small degree of utility."). See also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and Product
Development, 257 SCIENCE 903, 905 (1992) (stating that the USPTO rarely in-
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quirement that an inventor demonstrate a "substantial utility" in
exchange for the grant of a patent monopoly has become a "low
hurdle along the path to a patent. ,14
This Comment discusses the evolution of the utility requirement and the application of this requirement of patentability to
DNA15 sequences having no known function. Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the recent debate over DNA patentability - specifically the controversy concerning the patentability of expressed sequence tags. Part II analyzes the evolving
meaning of the utility requirement as interpreted by the federal
courts. Part III analyzes the types of public harm that can result
from a weakened utility requirement. Part IV proposes that the
USPTO should strictly adhere to the heightened utility require6
ment set forth by the Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson."

vokes the utility requirement); Thomas D. Kiley, Patents on Random Complementary DNA Fragments?257 SCIENCE 915, 915 (1992) (arguing that the utility requirement "approaches being a dead letter in current practice").
14. Reid G. Adler, Genome Research:Fulfilling the Public's Expectations for
Knowledge and Commercialization,257 SCIENCE 908, 911 (1992).
15. The structure, function, and behavior of a cell is determined by its genetic information, and a cell's genetic information is carried within its deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA"). BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES VII 4 (2000). A DNA
molecule is a polynucleotide consisting of covalently linked deoxyribonucleotide units, of which there are four types, each type of deoxyribonucleotide possessing a different base. Id. at 6. The four types of bases that differentiate
each of the deoxyribonucleotides are adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C),
and thymine (T). Id. In higher organisms, DNA molecules are organized into
very long molecules, called chromosomes, which reside within a membranebounded organelle known as the nucleus. Id. at 3, 955. Chromosomes consist
of two complementary DNA molecules; the DNA strands being held together
by weak bonds between corresponding bases of the deoxyribonucleotide units.
Id. at 8, 12. The chromosome can be divided into regions of DNA, or genes,
that control discrete hereditary characteristics, often corresponding to a single
protein. LEWIN, supra, at 63, 959. For example, human chromosomal DNA
contains an estimated 26,000 to 38,000 separate genes, the total set of genes
comprising the human genome. J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the
Human Genome, 291 SCIENCE 1304 (2001). To translate the genetic information encoded within a cell's DNA into a polypeptide molecule (or protein), a
complementary copy of a gene, known as a messenger ribonucleic acid
(mRNA), is first synthesized within the nucleus in a process known as transcription. LEWIN, supra. at 119-23, 971. The mRNA is then transported to the
cytoplasm - that portion of the cell bounded by the cellular membrane and excluding the nucleus - where the mRNA molecule is translated into a polypeptide molecule in a process known as translation. Id. at 125-25, 971. A polypeptide consists of a linear arrangement of covalently linked amino acids, with
twenty amino acids being found in naturally occurring polypeptides.
GEOFFREY ZUBAY, BIOCHEMISTRY 4-7 (1983). The linear arrangement of
amino acids forming a polypeptide is encoded by a series of triplet bases, or
codons, in the mRNA molecule (for example, the codon T-C-A encodes the
amino acid serine). LEWIN, supra, at 25.
16. 383 U.S. at 534-35.
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DNA SEQUENCE PATENTABILITY

A. DNA Sequences Constitute PatentableSubject Matter
For more than ten years, a debate has raged over the patentability of DNA sequences. 7 Although a handful of critics continue to attack the patentability of all DNA sequences (and more
specifically, the patentability of human DNA sequences), '8 the federal courts and USPTO' 9 now generally recognize that DNA sequences constitute patentable subject matter. 20 However, the efforts of some inventors to secure patent rights to DNA sequences
having no known function' has intensified the controversy over

17. Martin Enserink, Biomedical Patents: Patent Office May Raise the Bar
on Gene Claims, 287 SCIENCE 1196, 1196 (2000).
18. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 14, at 909 (discussing the argument that the
patenting of DNA sequences is unethical because such patenting limits public
access to "our universal heritage"); Bernadine Healy, On Gene Patenting, 327
N. ENGL. J. MED. 664, 666 (1992) (discussing the argument that DNA should
not be patentable as a matter of social policy); George Poste, The Case for Genomic Patenting, 378 NATURE 534, 534 (1995) (discussing the argument that
DNA sequences should not be patentable due to the "sanctity" of human DNA
sequences).
19. See John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 SCIENCE 689, 689 (1998)
(noting that while naturally occurring products are not patentable, the
USPTO recognizes that naturally occurring products - such as DNA sequences
- isolated or purified from their natural environment - i.e., cells - are patentable). See also David Dickson, British MPs 'Likely to Oppose Gene Patents',
373 NATURE 550, 550 (1995) (discussing the argument that cDNA molecules
are not naturally occurring products since they are generated in vitro chemical
reactions from spliced mRNA molecules, which in turn are generated from
unspliced mRNA molecules following transcription).
20. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (determining that Congress intended statutory subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by man"); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that prostaglandins purified from a crude cellular extract were not "naturally occurring" since the prostaglandins did not exist in
nature in pure form). In addition, DNA patenting has been endorsed by a
number of academic, industrial, and governmental groups, including the
American Society of Human Genetics ("ASHG"), the Biotechnology Industry
Organization ("BIO"), the Danish Council of Ethics, the English Patent Office,
the Commission of the European Communities ("EC"), the House of Commons
Science and Technology Committee, the Human Genome Organization
("HUGO"), the Industrial Biotechnology Association ("IBA"), the French National Institute of Health and Medical Research ("INSERM"), the United
Kingdom Medical Research Council ("MRC"), the National Institutes of Health
("NIH"), the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association ("PMA"), and the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO"). Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 907; Adler, supra note 14, at 912-13;
Poste, supra note 18, at 534; The Human Genome Project and Patents, 254
SCIENCE 1710, 1710 (1991); David Dixon, Mixed Reaction Greets New Gene
PatentProposalsfrom Brussels, 361 NATURE 285, 285 (1993).
21. Where a DNA sequence (for example, a cDNA sequence) has been derived from an mRNA sequence, the function of the DNA sequence is "known"
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DNA patentability."
B. The Patentabilityof Expressed Sequence Tags
In June of 1991, the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") reignited the debate concerning DNA sequence patentability when it
announced its intention to secure broad patent rights on a collection of 337 DNA sequences having no known function. 3 The collection of DNA sequences for which the NIH sought patent protection had been identified by a group of NIH investigators led by J.
Craig Venter during the course of the group's participation in the
Human Genome Project. 4
A year prior to the filing of the NIH patent application,
Venter had developed a technique for partially sequencing the approximately 30,000 expressed DNA sequences in the human
brain.25 Using this technique, Venter's group rapidly determined
the DNA sequence for short stretches of several cDNA clones randomly selected from a commercial brain cDNA library.26 Because
the short stretches of cDNA that Venter sequenced corresponded
to portions of expressed genes, Venter called the DNA fragments

(i.e., the DNA sequence encodes a protein), and it is the function of the protein
encoded by that DNA sequence that is not actually known. Healy, supra note
18, at 664-65.
22. See Christopher Anderson, Gene Patents: More Questions Than Answers, 354 NATURE 174, 174 (1991) (calling the controversy over DNA patenting "the most contentious scientific debate of the day").
23. See Leslie Roberts, Genome Patent Fight Erupts, 254 SCIENCE 184, 184
(1991) (stating that the NIH "dropped a bombshell whose repercussions ... reverberat[ed] throughout the genome community" when it filed a
patent application directed to a collection of DNA sequence fragments). See
also Healy, supra note 18, at 665 (stating that the NIH filing "sparked an important debate on the patenting not just of cDNA fragments, but also of complete genes for which knowledge of the in vivo biologic function is limited or
absent").
24. Christopher Anderson, US Patent Application Stirs Up Gene Hunters,
353 NATURE 485, 485 (1991). The Human Genome Project is an international
collaborative effort organized to determine the sequence of the entire human
genome. Leslie Roberts, NIH Gene Patents,Round Two, 255 SCIENCE 912, 912
(1992).
25. See Adams et al., Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed Sequence
Tags and Human Genome Project, 252 SCIENCE 1651 (1991) (describing an
automated partial DNA sequencing technique for generating expressed sequence tags). As the vast majority of the human genome consists of noncoding
sequence, the cDNA sequencing technique developed by Venter permitted him
to more rapidly determine the DNA sequence of that portion of the human genome encoding proteins that are expressed in the human brain. Id.
26. A cDNA library is a collection of DNA molecules generated from all of
the mRNA molecules present in a particular cell line, tissue, or organism, thus
representing all of the protein-encoding sequences in that cell line, tissue, or
organism.

BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 310

(3rd ed. 1994).
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expressed sequence tags, or ESTs. 7
In its patent application, the NIH sought patent protection
not only for the EST sequences themselves, but also for the fulllength coding sequences of the genes from which the EST sequences had been derived and for the protein products encoded by
these full-length sequences.' The NIH sought such broad patent
protection despite the fact that Venter had not yet determined the
function of the corresponding full-length sequences. 29 Critics as
serted that because the NIH could not specify a biological function
for the full-length sequences from which its EST sequences were
derived, the NIH should not be allowed to secure patent protection
for those sequences." In other words, the NIH filing presented the
question of whether DNA sequences having no known function
satisfied the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. section 101.31
To counter the argument that their EST sequences lacked
utility, the NIH set forth several uses for the sequences in their
patent application.32 For example, since the EST sequences were
derived from DNA sequences expressed in the human brain, the
NIH asserted that their EST sequences could be used as probes to
distinguish brain tissue from other types of tissue.33 Alternatively,
the NIH contended that the EST sequences could be used to design
oligonucleotides34 for use in chromosomal analysis, 5 the poly27. Adams et al., supra note 25, at 1651.

28. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 185 (discussing the first NIH EST patent
application which contained claims to more than 300 cDNA sequences).
29. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 23, at 184 (noting that when relying solely
on the determined sequence of an EST, Venter could determine the function of
the corresponding full-length DNA sequence only when the EST sequence corresponded to a gene whose function was already known).
30. Gene Patents, 359 NATURE 348, 348 (1992) ("For what use, in itself, is

the nucleotide structure of a gene when nothing is known of its function, in
normalcy and disease?").

31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
32. See Adler, supra note 14, at 911 (supporting first NIH patent application directed to 337 ESTs); Roberts, supra note 23, at 185 (discussing first NtH
patent application directed to 337 ESTs); Anderson, supra note 24, at 485 (discussing first NIH patent application directed to 337 ESTs); Roberts, supra
note 24, at 913 (discussing second NIH patent application directed to 2375
ESTs); Leslie Roberts, Gene Patenting: Top HHS Lawyer Seeks to Block NIH,
258 SCIENCE 209, 210 (1992) (discussing preliminary determination by NIH

parent agency to abandon patent applications directed to ESTs).
33. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 485 (noting also that since Venter had
not yet identified the function of the full-length sequences from which his EST
sequences were derived, Venter could not yet establish which of the EST sequences could be used as brain tissue-specific probes). Without additional sequence information concerning the full-length sequences, Venter could not determine which EST sequences would be expressed predominantly or
exclusively in the brain. Id.
34. Oligonucleotides are short single-stranded DNA or RNA molecules that
are often used as probes for detecting complementary DNA or RNA molecules;
the interaction between an oligonucleotide and its complementary DNA or
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merase chain reaction," recovery of the corresponding full-length
37
gene, as diagnostic markers for disease, 38 or in the design of antisense therapeutics.39
Critics of the NIH filing, however, were not persuaded by
these recitations of utility. ° One commentator labeled the NIH effort to secure patent protection on EST sequences having no
known function as a modern day land rush. 1 James Watson, who
with Francis Crick discovered the structure of DNA,42 described
RNA sequence generates a double-stranded molecule. ALBERTS ET AL., supra
note 26, at G-17.
35. Adler, supra note 14, at 911; Roberts, supra note 23, at 185; Roberts,
supra note 24, at 913. An oligonucleotide derived from an EST sequence can
be used as a probe to identify a complementary chromosomal DNA sequence
containing the EST sequence. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 26, at 312.
36. Adler, supra note 14, at 911; Roberts, supra note 24, at 913. Two oligonucleotides derived from the ends of an EST sequence can be used as primers for in vitro amplification of the EST sequence. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note
26, at 316-17.
37. Roberts, supra note 23, at 185. An oligonucleotide derived from an EST
sequence can be used as a probe to screen a cDNA library that has been enriched for full-length cDNA sequences in order to identify a complementary
full-length sequence containing the EST sequence. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note
26, at 312.
38. Roberts, supra note 32, at 210 (1992).
39. Roberts, supra note 23, at 185. An oligonucleotide derived from an EST
sequence, and which is complementary to an mRNA transcript generated from
a particular gene, can be used as an antisense therapeutic for the purpose of
inhibiting translation or promoting premature degradation of the mRNA transcript. LEWIN, supra note 15, at 312-15.
40. In December 1991, the American Society of Human Genetics ("ASHG"),
an organization consisting of 4,500 physicians, scientists, and genetic counselors, argued that "[tihe anticipated utility of an EST is simply that one could be
used as a research tool to identify the remainder of the coding region of the
gene.... The EST is, at best, a starting point for further research and should
not be patentable." The Human Genome Project and Patents, supra note 20, at
1711-12. In January 1992, the NIH Department of Energy Subcommittee for
Intraagency Coordination of Human Genome Research wrote: "We are unanimous in deploring the decision [of the NIH] to seek such patents. The subcommittee is particularly concerned that the claims widely reported in the
press extend far beyond the partial cDNAs themselves to include genes from
which they derive and the proteins they specify." Roberts, supra note 24, at
913. Maynard Olsen, a member of the Human Genome Project advisory panel,
stated that "[i]f the law is interpreted to give intellectual property rights for
naked DNA sequences [i.e., sequences having no known function], then the
law should be changed." Anderson, supra note 24, at 485.
41. See Free Trade in Human Sequence Data? 354 NATURE 171, 171 (1991)
(stating that the effort by the NIH to secure broad patent protection on its
EST sequences "is the equivalent in molecular biology of the nineteenth century practice in the United States of letting gold miners stake claims to the
mineral resources beneath arbitrarily chosen plots of land").
42. In 1962, James Watson and Francis Crick received a Nobel Prize for
Physiology and Medicine for their discovery of the structure of the DNA molecule. Medicine 1962, at http://www.nobel.se/chemistry/laureates/1980/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2000).
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the sequencing of cDNA molecules using (modern automated sequence analyzers as something "virtually any monkey" could do.43
Nobel laureate Paul Berg" stated that in filing a patent application directed to EST sequences having no known function, the NIH
had "opened Pandora's box."'
Other critics of the NIH filing argued that if the USPTO
granted the NIH a patent for its EST sequences, the purpose of the
patent system - to secure for the public's benefit inventions having
substantial utility46 - would be betrayed.47 C. Thomas Caskey, the
president of the Human Genome Organization ("HUGO")," noted
that since "[t]he task of identifying the biological function of a gene
is by far the most important step in terms of both its difficulty and
its social benefit," one of the primary objectives of the United
States patent system should be to ensure that this step "merits the
most incentive and protection."49 Caskey also warned that the patenting of DNA sequences having no known function could lead to
increased health-care costs and restricted access to DNA-based
therapies and diagnostics. 0
Several commentators predicted that EST patenting would
result in a curtailment in the commercial development of DNAbased therapies and diagnostics. 51 For example, if two patentees
held broad patent rights to different EST sequences derived from
the same gene, both patentees would hold dominant rights to that
gene. 2 As a result, a researcher wishing to develop therapies or

43. Roberts, supra note 23, at 184. In April of 1992, Watson resigned as
head of the NIH genome project, in part because of his disagreement with the
NIH concerning the patenting of EST sequences. Leslie Roberts, Genome
Data: Two Strikes Against cDNA Patents, 257 SCIENCE 1620, 1620 (1992).

44. In 1980, Paul Berg received a Nobel Prize for Chemistry for his pioneering

work

in

genetic

engineering.

Chemistry

1980,

at

http://www. nobel.se /medicine/laureates/1962 / (last visited Oct. 15, 2000).
45. Roberts, supra note 24, at 912.
46. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
47. See, e.g., Kiley, supra note 13, at 917 (calling for the USPTO to reject

the NIH EST application and thus, "restore teeth" to the requirement that inventions have substantial utility).
48. HUGO, a collaboration between England, France, Japan, and the
United States, was formed in 1990 for the purpose of sequencing the entire
human genome by the year 2005. HUGO Warningover BroadPatents on Gene
Sequences, 387 NATURE 326, 326 (1997).
49. David Dickson, HUGO and HGS Clash over 'Utility' of Gene Sequences
in US Patent Law, 374 NATURE 751, 751 (1995).
50. Declan Butler, Patent System Gets Vote of Support from Gene Workers,
373 NATURE 376, 376 (1995).

51. Leslie Roberts, Gene Patents: Scientists Voice Their Opposition, 256
SCIENCE 1273, 1273 (1992) (quoting patent attorney Michael Roth as saying

that EST sequence patenting "does not build a road to further advances, it just
builds a toll booth along the way").
52. Doll, supra note 19, at 690; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Do EST Patents Matter? 14 TRENDS GENET. 379, 379 (1998). Alternatively, broad patent rights to
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diagnostics related to a particular gene would be forced to secure
multiple licenses on that gene or forgo the development of such
therapies or diagnostics. 3 The Industrial Biotechnology Association ("IBA")' predicted that the patenting of EST sequences would
encourage pharmaceutical companies to abandon research efforts
aimed at developing pharmaceutical products - such efforts having
significant social benefits - in order to engage in "routine genetic
sequencing for the purpose of staking claims to as much of the ge5
nome as possible" - such efforts having far less social benefit.
In September of 1992, a little more than one year after the
NIH had announced the EST patent application filing, 6 NIH Director Bernadine Healy informed the Senate judiciary subcommittee on patents that the USPTO had rejected the application.57 The
application had been rejected on the grounds that the EST sequences recited by the NIH lacked utility and novelty and were
obvious.M The USPTO found that the EST sequences lacked novelty because they had been derived from cDNA clones present in a
publicly available cDNA library. 9 The EST sequences were found
to be obvious because portions of the EST sequences had already
been published."0 Finally, the USPTO found that the EST se-

a single EST sequence may encompass all of the members from a group of related genes, i.e., a gene family. The Human Genome Project and Patents, su-

pra note 20, at 1712.
53. Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 379. See also The Human Genome Project
and Patents, supra note 20, at 1712 (noting that "[iun the commercial sector
there may be a reluctance to invest in research on EST-identified genes when

a small but unknown fraction of them will turn out to have commercial utility,
and when the useful ones may be contested by patents on other ESTs from the
same gene").
54. The IBA consists of 125 companies representing eighty percent of the

U.S. investment in biotechnology. Adler, supra note 14, at 912.
55. Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 907.
56. The NIH had announced the filing of a second patent application covering 2,375 additional EST sequences - or approximately five percent of estimated number of human genes - in February of 1992. Roberts, supra note 24,
at 912. This announcement had coincided with the publication of the additional EST sequences. Adams et al., Sequence Identification of 2,375 Human
Brain Genes, 355 NATURE 632 (1992). In a "retreat" from its original position,

the NIH sought claims to only the EST sequences and the full-length sequences of the corresponding genes in the second application. Roberts, supra

note 24, at 913.
57. See Leslie Roberts, Gene Patents: Rumors Fly over Rejection of NIH
Claim, 257 SCIENCE 1855, 1855 (1992) (noting that the initial NIH EST application had been rejected by the USPTO in an office action dated August 20,

1992).
58. Roberts, supra note 32, at 210; Roberts, supra note 57, at 1855.

59. Roberts, supra note 57, at 1855. Venter had determined the DNA sequence for cDNA clones selected from a commercially available brain cDNA
library. Adams et al., supra note 25, at 1651.
60. Christopher Anderson, NIH cDNA Patent Rejected; Backers Want to
Amend Law, 359 NATURE 263, 263 (1992). In its EST sequence applications,
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quences lacked utility because the functions of their corresponding
full-length genes were unknown, and in the absence of such
knowledge the value of the EST sequences as probes was unclear.6'
Despite external opposition and intra-agency debate,62 the
NIH continued to prosecute its EST sequence applications. 6 However, upon receiving a second rejection on its initial filing,' the
NIH abruptly abandoned its efforts to secure patent protection for
the sequences. ' The withdrawal by the NIH of its EST sequence
applications from further consideration, 6 and the two prior
USPTO rejections, did not, as many opponents of the NIH filings

the NIH had claimed both the EST sequence as well as any 15-nucleotide
fragment derived from the EST sequence. Id. Claims to the 15-nucleotide
fragments were rejected as obvious because a number of the claimed 15nucleotide fragments could be found in publicly accessible DNA sequence databases. Id.
61. Roberts, supra note 57, at 1855. In rejecting the claims for lack of utility, the USPTO stated that:
Given what is disclosed in the instant application, it would be necessary
for one to do further work in order to establish a utility for any of the
nucleotides embraced by the claims.... Although the oligonucleotides
embraced by the claims may be hybridized to a variety of different
preparations of other nucleic acids, one of skill in the art has no clue as
to the significance of any result of such hybridization because the instant application fails to provide any basis for the interpretation of any
putative results.
Roberts, supra note 32, at 210.
62. Michael Astrue, the general counsel for the Department of Health and
Human Services (the parent agency of the NIH) - following an unsuccessful
attempt to convince the USPTO to suspend consideration of the first NIH application on policy grounds - initiated an intraagency "civil war" by instructing the NIH not to file a response to the August, 1992 rejection. Christopher
Anderson, Gene Wars Escalate as US Official Battles NIH over Pursuitof Patent, 359 NATURE 467, 467 (1992). The NIH, however, prevailed when Astrue
departed from the Department of Health and Human Services in November of
1992. Christopher Anderson, NIH to Appeal Patent Decision, 259 SCIENCE
302, 302 (1993).
63. See Anderson, NIH to Appeal Patent Decision, supra note 62, at 302
(noting that the NIH filed a response to the USPTO rejection in January of
1993).
64. See Diane Gershon, US and British ResearchersAgree Not to Seek Gene
Fragment Patents, 367 NATURE 583, 583 (1994) (noting that in August of 1993,
the USPTO rejected NIH claims to 2,421 EST sequences - which included the
original 337 EST sequences and an additional 2,084 EST sequences filed in a
subsequent continuation-in-part of the original application).
65. Following the second rejection of its initial filing, NIH Director Harold
Varmus announced that any effort to secure patent rights on DNA sequences
having no known function was "not in the best interests of the public or science." Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid for Gene Patents, 263 SCIENCE
909, 909 (1994).
66. See Gershon, supra note 64, at 583 (noting that the NIH decided not to
appeal the second rejection of its initial application and to withdraw a pending
application directed to 4,448 additional cDNA sequences). In total, the NIH
had filed on 6,869 EST sequences. Anderson, supra note 65, at 909.
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had hoped, resolve the issue of whether DNA sequences having no
known function were patentable.67
Instead, the controversy surrounding the NIH applications
merely initiated a race on the part of both public research organizations6 and private companies 69 to secure patent protection on
DNA sequences having no known function. 0 In July of 1995, these
secondary combatants were rewarded for their efforts when the
USPTO published new Utility Examination Guidelines that seemingly removed some obstacles from the patenting of EST sequences." The USPTO further clarified its position regarding this
issue in February of 1997 when, in what some commentators saw
as a reversal from its previous position,7" the USPTO declared that
EST sequences were indeed patentable.73 The USPTO declared
that since EST sequences were acknowledged to have utilities
apart from the full-length genes from which they were derived, the
failure to specify the function of a full-length gene would no longer
prevent an inventor from securing broad patent rights to an EST
sequence.74 However, the publication of the Utility Examination
Guidelines and USPTO declarations did not completely resolve the
uncertainty concerning the issue of EST patentability.75

67. Anderson, supra note 65, at 909.
68. In July of 1992, the MRC had filed a patent application directed to approximately 1,200 EST sequences. Anderson, supra note 65, at 910; Alan
Howarth, PatentingComplementary DNA, 256 SCIENCE 11, 11 (1992). In announcing its filing, the MRC stated that it would waive its patent rights to the
sequences if an international agreement prohibiting the patenting of DNA sequences having no known function was reached. Howarth, supra, at 11; David
Dixon, MRC to Limit Patents on cDNA Sequences, 366 NATURE 6, 6 (1993).
The MRC subsequently joined with the NIH in withdrawing its application.
Gershon, supra note 64, at 583.
69. Human Genome Sciences, Inc. (Rockville, Maryland), the commercial
arm of The Institute of Genomic Research ("TIGR") (Gaithersburg, Maryland),
a non-profit research institute formed by Venter following his departure from
the NIH in July of 1992, began to seek patent protection for the numerous
EST sequences it identified. Anderson, supra note 65, at 910. Incyte Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Palo Alto, California) also began to file patent applications directed to uncharacterized cDNA sequences. Anderson, NIH to Appeal Patent
Decision, supra note 62, at 302 (1993).
70. See Anderson, supra note 65, at 910 (discussing the decision by the NIH
to abandon their EST patent applications).
71. Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36263, 36264 (1995).
72. See Dorothy R. Auth, Are ESTs Patentable?15 NAT. BIOTECHNOL. 911,
911 (1997) (stating that the issue of EST patentability has not yet been resolved).
73. Claire O'Brien, US Decision 'Will Not Limit Gene Patents', 385 NATURE
755, 755 (1997).
74. See Doll, supra note 19, at 689-90 (stating that ESTs have patentable
utility).
75. See Meredith Wadman, Patent Office Replies to Fears over ESTs, 386
NATURE 747, 747 (1997) (noting that USPTO commissioner Bruce Lehman, in
responding to a letter from the NIH arguing that EST sequences lack utility,
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT
A.

The Basis of the Modern Utility Requirement

The modern utility requirement derives from three sources:
the Constitution, 6 Congressional legislation implementing the
Constitutional mandate,77 and federal court decisions interpreting
the meaning of the word "useful" in the Constitution and in the
implementing legislation.7 8 Of all the requirements for patentability, 79 only the utility requirement finds explicit mandate in the
constitutional text,' and since the passage of the first Patent Act
in 1790, an inventor has been required to demonstrate that his invention is "useful" in order to secure a patent on the invention.8 '
However, while the concept of utility holds a central place in patent legislation,8 the Patent Act fails to provide a definition for the
term "useful."' Inventors have had to rely instead on the interpretations of the term "useful" as provided by the federal courts primarily by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("CAFC"), its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA"), and the Supreme Court.

stated that the "[miere allegation of the utility of an EST as a probe without
further disclosure is not sufficient to meet the utility and enablement criteria"). This statement seemed to conflict with an earlier declaration that the
assertion of a utility of an EST sequence as a probe would be sufficient.
O'Brien, supra note 73, at 755. In a subsequent clarification, Lehman suggested that sufficient utilities included the use of an EST sequence as a probe
for forensic identification, tissue type identification, chromosome mapping,
and identification of the full-length gene from which the EST sequence was
derived. Auth, supra note 72, at 911.
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
78. Andrew T. Kight, Note, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibility and the
PTO Utility Guidelines in Light of Brenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997, 1017 (1998); Nathan Machin, Comment, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretationof the Utility
Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 421, 437
(1999).
79. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (stating that for an invention to be patentable it must be novel, useful, nonobvious, and directed to
statutory subject matter, as required by 35 U.S.C. sections 101, 102, and 103,
and disclosed so as to make the invention available to the public, as required
by 35 U.S.C. sections 112 and 113).
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
81. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966).
82. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966).
83. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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B. JudicialInterpretationof the Utility Requirement
The first interpretation of the term "useful" was provided by
Justice Story in Lowell v. Davis': "[aill that the law requires is,
that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the wellbeing, good policy, or sound morals of society. The word 'useful,'
therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral."' Justice Story's concept of utility - in which
utility was intertwined with morality - relegated the utility requirement to de minimis status."6 By applying a moral utility
standard, an inventor could not be denied a patent on the grounds
that his invention lacked utility if the invention was neither harmful nor immoral."
By lowering the utility requirement to merely a de minimis
standard, however, a patentee might secure patent rights to an invention that - while neither harmful nor immoral - was not truly
"useful." Justice Story noted that while it was material to the interests of a patentee that an invention be useful, the utility of the
invention was ultimately of no importance to the public.8 An invention that was "not extensively useful" would "silently sink into
contempt and disregard." 9 Because the market ultimately determined the value of any invention, an invention lacking utility
would be of little value to a patentee and a limited monopoly extended to the patentee for such an invention would be of little cost
to the public. 90
The sufficiency of the de minimis utility standard rests, there84. 15 F. Cas. 1018 (D.Mass. 1817). In a patent infringement suit in which
the alleged infringer challenged the utility of the patentee's invention, the
court found that the invention satisfied the utility requirement as it was neither "mischievous" nor "injurious." Id. at 1019.

85. Id.
86. Justice Story offered several examples of inventions unpatentable for
want of utility: "a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or

to facilitate private assassination." Id.
87. Id.
88. Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.

89. Id.
90. See Machin, supra note 78, at 436 (noting that "misinterpretation of
Judge Story's insightful articulation of the utility requirement as shrill moralizing obscures his real message which is that the marketplace is the ultimate
arbiter of an invention's utility"). See also Kight, supra note 78, at 1010 (noting that the public does not desire inventions lacking intrinsic utility); Eric P.
Mirabel, "Practical Utility" is a Useless Concept, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 811, 823
(1987) (stating that when a patent is granted on an invention having limited
or uncertain use, the patentee takes nothing from the public since the public
does not desire "to make, use, or sell a useless invention"); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg and Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentabilityof Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of PartialcDNA Sequences,
23 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 5 (1995) (stating that the market functions to limit the value
of patents on inventions having only minimal utility).
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fore, on the proposition that few individuals will go to the trouble
and expense of securing patents on inventions that lack utility.9
However, while the de minimis standard may be adequate for assessing the patentability of inventions in the mechanical arts,
some have argued that this standard is far from adequate for assessing the patentability of inventions in the chemical and biological arts.9" For example, DNA sequences having no known function
would appear to satisfy the de minimis utility standard, as such
sequences are neither harmful nor immoral. However, because
the function of these sequences can be eventually determined,
such sequences are not truly useless, and therefore, limited monopolies extended on such sequences may ultimately be of great
cost to the public.93
For nearly 150 years following Lowell, the federal courts applied Justice Story's de minimis utility standard. 9 This changed
when the Supreme Court, in Brenner v. Manson,9 determined that
91. Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 905.
92. See id. (contending that although the sequences that the NIH seeks
patent protection for are not useless, the NIH - in the absence of ascribing a
function to these sequences - should not be able to secure patent protection
ahead of subsequent researchers who discover the function); Karen F. Lech,
Note, Human Genes Without Functions:Biotechnology Tests the Patent Utility
Standard, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1631, 1654-55 (1993) (stating that in the
area of recombinant DNA technology, the application of a less rigorous utility
standard will permit patentees to secure patent rights for inventions lacking
the degree of utility contemplated by Congress). But see Mirabel, supra note
90, at 823 (stating that there are "negative consequences" when patent protection is denied for an invention having "limited or uncertain" use, but that
there are no negative consequences when patent protection is granted for a
"useless" invention since the patentee takes nothing from the public).
93. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 907 (discussing the possible effects of
EST patenting on commercial scientific research); Lech, supra note 92, at 1657
(noting that DNA sequences having no known function may, at the time of
patenting, have no diagnostic or therapeutic utility and that such utilities may
be determined following an elucidation of the function).
94. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (holding that for an invention to be patentable, it must possess "substantial utility").
95. Id. The Commissioner of Patents (Brenner) sought review of the judgment by the CCPA that Manson was entitled to a declaration of interference.
Id. at 522. Manson contended that he had discovered a process for making
certain known steroids prior to the earliest priority date of a patent disclosing
the same process. Id. at 521. Manson's request for an interference was denied
by the examiner on the ground that Manson failed to disclose any utility for
the steroids produced by the claimed process. Id. In affirming the examiner's
determination, the Board stated that "[iut is our view that the statutory requirement of usefulness of a product cannot be presumed merely because [the
product] happens to be closely related to another compound which is known to
be useful." Id. at 522. The CCPA reversed the decision of the Board, stating
that "'where a claimed process produces a known product it is not necessary to
show utility for the product,' so long as the product 'is not alleged to be detrimental to the public interest.'" Id. The Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the CCPA. Id. at 536.
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Justice Story's interpretation of the utility .requirement gave the
term "useful" a "special meaning" that the Court could not accept
"in the absence of evidence that Congress so intended."96 While
recognizing that "a simple, everyday word can be pregnant with
ambiguity when applied to the facts of life,"97 the Court found Justice Story's de minimis standard to be particularly insufficient in
assessing the patentability of inventions in the chemical arts. 9'
While any invention that is not "frivolous or injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society"9" will satisfy the
moral utility standard, only an invention exhibiting "specific" and
"substantial" utility will satisfy the Brenner utility standard. 00
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the utility requirement was
grounded in its understanding that the "basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a
patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.""' When a patent is granted for
an invention "which has not been developed and pointed to the de96. Id. at 533.
Justice Story's language sheds little light on our subject. Narrowly
read, it does no more than compel us to decide whether the invention in
question is "frivolous and insignificant"-a query no easier of application than the one built into the statute. Read more broadly, so as to allow the patenting of any invention not positively harmful to society, it
places such a special meaning on the word "useful" that we cannot accept it in the absence of evidence that Congress so intended. There are,
after all, many things in this world that may not be considered "useful"
but which, nevertheless, are totally without a capacity for harm.
Id.
97. Id. at 529.
98. Id. at 530 (stating that the utility requirement is difficult to apply to
inventions in the chemical arts, "where little or nothing is wholly beyond the
pale of 'utility' - if the word is given its broadest reach").
99. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (D. Mass. 1817).
100. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35.
Whatever weight is attached to the value of encouraging disclosure and
of inhibiting secrecy, we believe a more compelling consideration is that
a process patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed and
pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge
that should be granted only if clearly commanded by the statute. Until
the process claim has been reduced to production of a product shown to
be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power to block off whole areas of
scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public. The
basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress
for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from
an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point-where specific benefit exists in currently available form-there is insufficient justification for permitting
an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.
Id. at 534-35.
101. Id. at 534.
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gree of specific utility,"' such a patent can "confer power to block
off whole areas of scientific
development, without compensating
"10 3
benefit to the public.
In a foreshadowing of the controversy surrounding the patentability of DNA fragments, the Court recognized that "what now
seems without 'use' may tomorrow command the grateful attention
of the public."0 4 Still, the Court declared that "a patent is not a
hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion."'
In determining that Manson's
claimed process for the production of compounds having no known
function failed to satisfy the utility requirement, the Court confined the operation of the patent system "to the world of commerce
rather than to the realm of philosophy."'
It has been suggested
that the Brenner utility standard functions to distinguish basic research (that which is in the "realm of philosophy" and therefore
unpatentable) from applied technology (that which is in the "world
of commerce" and therefore patentable). 7 Thus, it would appear
that until an inventor can ascribe a function to a DNA sequence,
the sequence belongs not to the "world of commerce," but rather to
the "realm of philosophy."
As the Supreme Court was providing the utility requirement
with teeth in Brenner,"°' the CCPA was hearing oral arguments in
a case involving very similar circumstances.'
In In re Kirk,"' the
CCPA determined that the applicants' assertion that their claimed
compounds possessed "biological activity" was too vague to satisfy
the Brenner utility standard."' Kirk, however, is remembered
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536.

Id. at 536.
Id.
Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 905.
383 U.S. at 519; Kiley, supra note 13, at 917.

109. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
110. Id. Appellants (Kirk and Pertrow) sought review of the judgment by
the Board affirming the examiner's rejection of claims to certain steroid compounds. Id. at 937. Appellants contended that their specification complied
with 35 U.S.C. sections 101 and 112 because the claimed steroids "have present and useful biological activity of the nature known for analogous steroidal

compounds," and "one skilled in the art would know how to use the compounds
of the claims to take advantage of their presently-existing biological activity."
Id. at 939. In rejecting appellants' claims, the examiner concluded that:
"[wihat appellants are really saying to those in the art is take these steroids,
experiment, and find what use they do have as medicines." Id. at 940. The
Board affirmed the examiner's rejection of appellants' claims and the CCPA

affirmed the Board's decision. Id. at 946.
111. Id. at 942.
We do not believe that it was the intention of the statutes to require the
Patent Office, the courts, or the public to play the sort of guessing game
that might be involved if an applicant could satisfy the requirements of
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more for Judge Rich's critical dissent against the higher utility
standard prescribed by the Supreme Court in Brenner than for the
CCPA majority's application of this standard."
Judge Rich believed that the majority, in applying the Brenner utility standard in Kirk, was reading the Brenner decision too
broadly,' thereby "changing the course of the law as it has been
established for over a century and a half.""4 According to Judge
Rich, Justice Story's de minimis standard more closely paralleled
the intention of Congress" that "any degree of utility, however
slight" complies with the requirement that an invention be "useful." "6 The modifiers used by the majority to describe the degree of
utility required for patentability"7 were, due to their "great vagueness,"" 8 "nothing but trouble-makers, as time will amply demonstrate."" 9 Judge Rich also believed that the application of a higher2
utility standard would lead inventors to concoct "legal utilities" '
or conceal, rather than disclose, information."'
Judge Rich further argued that the "quidpro quo" philosophy
- used by the Court in Brenner to justify a higher utility standard
- had no statutory basis 2 and could not be "squared with legal

the statutes by indicating the usefulness of a claimed compound in
terms of possible use so general as to be meaningless.

Id.
112. Michelle L. Johnson, Comment, In re Brana and the Utility Examination Guidelines: A Light at the End of the Tunnel? 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 285,
310-11 (1996) (stating that the patent bar and public interest may have been
better served by a recognition of the per se utility requirement supported by
Judge Rich in Kirk); Machin, supra note 78, at 430 (suggesting that the
USPTO and the CAFC, by moving away the "extreme and unequivocal holding" of Brenner, were responding to Judge Rich's dissent in Kirk).
113. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 948.
114. Id. at 964.
115. Id. at 954. "Though I am sure the majority think they are being most
reasonable, adhering to principles embodied in the Constitution, and following
what Congress 'must have intended,' in point of fact they are legislating and
ignoring the law as Congress enacted it." Id. "It has been pointed out time
and again since the days of Justice Story... that degree of utility is of no public concern whatsoever." Id. at 955.
116. Id.
117. Terms such as "practical," "substantial," "specific," and "currently available." Id. at 960.
118. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 960.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 961 (stating that the public interest would not be benefited if an
inventor was forced to waste "scarce scientific and inventive brainpower...
concocting 'legal utilities" that ultimately would not be pursued, merely to satisfy a higher utility standard).
121. Id. (stating that the utility standard advocated by the majority would
encourage an inventor to conceal, rather thari disclose, the important uses the
inventor contemplates for fear of having to actually prove that such uses exist).
122. Id. at 964.
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history. " 12 Such a philosophy was also unnecessary, in Judge
Rich's opinion, since a patent granted on an invention having very
124
little use would be of correspondingly little value to the patentee.
In fact, in determining the patentability of chemical compounds,
Judge Rich contended that a per se utility standard (in which
chemical compounds were presumed to be useful) would be more
practical from an administrative
standpoint than either the de
121
minimis or Brenner standards.
In view of Judge Rich's discussion of patentability in In re
Bergy, 1 6 wherein an inventor must obtain "the separate keys
to.. .the three doors of sections 101, 102, and 103 "127 in order to secure a patent, it is somewhat surprising that Judge Rich advocated merely a per se utility requirement in Kirk. The application
of a per se utility requirement would prop open one of the "doors"
to patentability, and thus, compromise an important goal of the
patent system - to acquire meaningful disclosure for the public's
benefit. 12 Furthermore, it is difficult to square Judge Rich's belief
that the majority in Kirk was "legislating"'2 9 by applying the
higher utility standard of Brenner, with the role played by the
Court in developing the requirement of nonobviousness. 130 While
the requirement of nonobviousness was codified in the Patent Act
of 1952 - largely through the efforts of Judge Rich 131 - the concept
was first injected into the patent law 32
by the Supreme Court, and
not Congress, nearly 100 years earlier.1
Notwithstanding arguments favoring the utility standard articulated in Brenner, many opponents of the "substantial" utility
requirement viewed the CAFC's next significant utility-related decision in In re Brana"'3 as a move away from Brenner's "extreme
123. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 955.
124. Id. "[Ilf the inventor has given nothing, the government has given nothing. The right to exclude others from the use of something no one wishes to
use is worthless - economically." Id. at 964.
125. Id. at 957.
126. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), affd sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980).
127. Bergy, 596 F.2d at 960.
128. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966).
129. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
130. Id. at 965. "The only point in the statute at which Congress injected
any concept in the nature of degree is the nonobviousness requirement of section 103, a requirement injected into the law by the Supreme Court in 1850."

Id.
131. Patent and Trademark Office Mourns Death of Judge Giles S. Rich, supra note 2.

132. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850) (holding a patent on a
porcelain door knob invalid because the substitution of porcelain for wood required no more ingenuity and skill than that possessed by "an ordinary mechanic").
133. 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Appellants (Brana et al.) sought review
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and unequivocal holding"" and towards the view put forth by
Judge Rich in Kirk."" However, the CAFC did not go quite that
far, since the court was able to distinguish the utilities asserted by
the appellants in Brana from those asserted by the appellants in
Kirk.' Furthermore, in Brana, the CAFC addressed the question
of whether the appellants produced sufficient proof of an asserted
utility, rather than whether the degree of utility asserted by the
appellants complied with the utility requirement. 13 Finally, in
Brenner, the Supreme Court refused to express a view on the question addressed by the CAFC in Brana,3' specifically whether proof
of an asserted utility can be demonstrated using accepted animal
or cellular models. Yet, to many practitioners, the decision in
Brana, when coupled with the USPTO's contemporaneous publication of new Utility Examination Guidelines, 39 suggested that the
CAFC and USPTO were lowering the utility requirement 40 and
perhaps even returning to the de minimis standard. 4 '

of the judgment by the Board affirming the examiner's rejection of claims to 5nitrobenzodeisoquinoline-1,3-dione compounds for use as antitumor substances. Id. at 1562. Appellants contended that their specification complied
with 35 U.S.C. section 112 because it stated that the claimed compounds had
"a better action and a better action spectrum as antitumor substances" than
the related compounds of K.D. Paull et al., which had been screened for antitumor activity in mouse tumor models. Id. In rejecting appellants' claims, the
examiner concluded that the prior art tests of K.D. Paull et al. were insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation that the claimed compounds had a
practical utility. Id. at 1563-64. The Board affirmed the examiner's rejection
of appellants' claims. Id. at 1564. In reversing the Board's decision, the CAFC
stated that "proof of an alleged pharmaceutical property for a compound by
statistically significant tests with standard experimental animals is sufficient
to establish utility." Id. at 1567.
134. Machin, supra note 78, at 430.
135. Id.
136. Brana, 51 F.3d at 1565-66.
137. Id. at 1564. "The question is, with regard to pharmaceutical inventions,
what must the applicant prove regarding the practical utility or usefulness of
the invention for which patent protection is sought." Id. See Kight, supra note
78, at 1014 (noting that Brana specifically deals with what patent applicants
must prove regarding utility); Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 90, at 10 (noting that in Brana the issue was what an applicant must prove to establish
utility).
138. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966) (stating in note 17 that
"[iun light of our disposition of the case, we express no view as to the patentability of a process whose sole demonstrated utility is to yield a product
shown to inhibit the growth of tumors in laboratory animals").
139. Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 71.
140. See Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 90, at 12 (stating that as a result of
Brana and the Utility Examination Guidelines, the utility standard "may be
receding from its recent high-water mark"); Johnson, supra note 112, at 30506 (stating that Brana restores the traditional de minimis utility standard).
141. Johnson, supra note 112, at 305-06.
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Utility Examination Guidelines

Under the 1995 Utility Examination Guidelines,' an inventor complied with section 101 by asserting a single utility that was
both "specific" and "credible."' In omitting the requirement from
Brenner that an asserted utility be "substantial,"'" the Utility Examination Guidelines were seen by many as propping open the
"door" to section 101.145 By weakening the utility requirement, the
USPTO allowed a number of inventors to secure broad patent
rights on1 46inventions related to DNA sequences having no known
function.

III. PUBLIC HARM RESULTING FROM A WEAKENED UTILITY
REQUIREMENT AND THE REVISED UTILITY EXAMINATION GUIDELINES
A. PatentProtectionfor Unknown Uses
When a patent protection is granted for a DNA sequence having no known function, several aspects of patent law conspire to
damage the public interest. For example, to secure a patent, an
inventor need only specify a single utility,4 7 and once a patent has
been granted, the inventor is entitled to "every use of which his invention is susceptible, whether such use be known or unknown to
him.""8 Thus, under the Utility Examination Guidelines, an inventor who asserted that an EST sequence could be used as a
probe would have the right, after securing a patent on that sequence, to exclude others from using the EST sequence for any
other use. ' Critics of the Utility Examination Guidelines sug142. Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 71.

143. Id. at 36264. "If the applicant has asserted that the claimed invention
is useful for any particular purpose (i.e., a 'specific utility') and that assertion
would be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art, [an exam-

iner shall] not impose a rejection based on lack of utility." Id. at 36264.
144. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35.
145. See Kenneth G. Chahine, Patent Office Resurrects EST Debate, 16 NAT.
BIOTECHNOL. 711, 711 (1998) (stating that "[u]nless the guidelines are
amended.. .they will represent a major victory for those seeking broad EST
patent protection"); Kight, supra note 78, at 999-1000 (stating that the "guidelines.. make utility-based rejections mere artifacts").
146. Janice Au-Young et al., Human Kinase Homologs, U.S. Patent No.

5,817,479 (1998) is generally considered to be the first EST patent granted by
the USPTO. Tony Reichhardt, Patent on Gene FragmentSends Researchers a

Mixed Message... as Germany Hesitates over Brussels Directive, 396 NATURE
499, 499 (1998).
147. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
148. In re Thuau, 135 F.2d 344 (C.C.P.A. 1943).

149. See Kiley, supra note 13, at 915 (noting that an inventor may exclude
others from making, using, or selling his patented invention for any use, even
though the inventor recognizes only one use for that invention); Chahine, supra note 145, at 711 (noting that a researcher who determines the function of
a gene that contains a patented EST sequence could be found to infringe that
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gested that by applying a lower utility standard, the USPTO encouraged inventors to concoct utilities, 0 the very harm of which
Judge Rich warned.'
B. "Open" Claim Language
When patent protection is granted for DNA sequences having
no known function, the longstanding practice of granting very
broad claim coverage to an inventor who uses "open" claim language (i.e., the claim transition term "comprising"') can also result in damage to the public interest. Thus, when an inventor uses
"open" claim language in a claim to an EST sequence (e.g., "[an
isolated nucleic acid comprising the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID
NO: 1."), covers both the recited EST sequence and any larger sequence containing the EST sequence. 3 Under the Utility Examination Guidelines, "open" language claims to EST sequences would
encompass the corresponding full-length gene even if the fulllength gene was characterized at a later date.'" However, the
prior grant of an EST patent to the corresponding full-length
gene. "
The USPTO, in addressing the scope of protection for
claims to EST sequences, contended that since a patent for a television picture tube would not preclude another from securing a
patent for a television set, an EST patent would not preclude another from securing a patent would not preclude another from securing a patent for the corresponding full-length sequence. 5 6 This
analogy, however, fails to acknowledge the critical distinction between the two inventions. Specifically, while an inventor can
readily choose to "invent around" the television picture tube patent, 1 7 an inventor will most certainly be unable to "invent around"

EST patent by using the gene).
150. See Kiley, supra note 13, at 916 (stating that the utilities asserted by
the NIH in their initial EST filing "are utilities concocted to carry the patents
until someone finds out what the DNA is really good for").
151. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
152. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 15 (1997).
153. Auth, supra note 72, at 911.
154. Id.
155. See Doll, supra note 19, at 690 (stating that the patenting of a DNA
fragment is analogous to having a patent on a picture tube). The USPTO con-

tended that as the granting of a patent for the picture tube would not have
precluded another from securing a patent for the television set, the granting of

an EST patent would not preclude another from securing a patent for the corresponding full-length sequence. Id. However, the USPTO also contended
that as the holder of a picture tube patent could have sued the holder of a television set patent for infringing the picture tube patent, the holder of an EST
patent could sue the holder of a patent for the corresponding full-length se-

quence for infringing the EST patent. Id.
156. Id.
157. The inventor who secures a subsequent patent on a television could, for
example, use an active matrix screen.
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the EST sequence patent.'58
C. OverlappingPatent Rights
The use of "open" claim language in claims to EST sequences
also raises the possibility that by claiming different EST sequences within a single gene, multiple parties will secure patent
rights blocking the use of that gene." 9 This could lead to increased
costs for biomedical research as investigators who are interested
in developing therapies or diagnostics related to that gene will be
forced to secure multiple licenses.16' The overlapping patent rights
arising from the patenting of EST sequences could also lead to increased costs for producing commercial genetic diagnostic devices
(such as gene chips'61), which require the use of multiple DNA
fragments from thousands of different genes."'
D. Revised Utility Examination Guidelines
The USPTO attempted to address the concerns of those who
criticized the Utility Examination Guidelines by publishing Revised Utility Examination Guidelines in December of 1999.163
Many opponents of EST patentability view the revision to the Utility Examination Guidelines as yet another dramatic change in
USPTO policy. 6 4 Under the Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, an inventor must assert a utility that is "specific," "credible,"
and "substantial" in order to comply with the requirements of section 101.16' Thus, the Revised Utility Examination Guidelines

158. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 700 (1998).
159. Id. at 699; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genetics and the Law: The Ethical,
Legal, and Social Implications of Genetic Technology and Biomedical Ethics:
Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large-Scale
cDNA Sequencing, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557 (1996).
160. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 964 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
161. See Stephen P. A. Fodor et al., Light-Directed, Spatially Addressable
ParallelChemical Synthesis, 251 SCIENCE 767 (1991) (describing a process for
fabricating gene chips); Michael C. Pirrung et al., Large Scale Photolithographic Solid Phase Synthesis of Polypeptides and Receptor Binding Screening
Thereof, U.S. Patent No. 5,143,854 (1992) (describing a process for fabricating
gene chips).
162. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 158, at 699.
163. Revised Utility Examination Guidelines;Request for Comments, 64 Fed.

Reg. 71,440 (1999) (noting that many comments received in response to the
request for public comment on the Interim Written Description Guidelines and
Utility Examination Guidelines argued that sufficient patentable utility is not
shown when the sole disclosed use of an EST sequence is to identify the function of its corresponding gene, suggesting that the final Utility Examination
Guidelines should be revised and clarified).
164. Enserink, supra note 17, at 1196; Tom Hollon, Gene Patent Revisions to
Remove Some Controversies, 6 NAT. MED. 362, 362 (2000).
165. Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 163, at 71441.
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seemingly restore the requirement from Brenner that an asserted
utility be "substantial."66 The USPTO has suggested that under
the Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, DNA sequences having no known function will be unlikely to satisfy the utility requirement. 16 7 However, it remains to be seen whether the new
standard will, in practice, "raise the bar" as to the utility requirement.' 6
IV.

RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF

EST PATENTABILITY

The Revised Utility Examination Guidelines were drafted in
large part to address the issue of the patentability of biotechnological inventions. 6 9 The Revised Guidelines attempt to resolve
this issue by restoring a "substantial" utility query to the examination process. 7 ° Only a strict adherence to the "substantial" utility requirement will confer upon the public the benefit of valuable
invention disclosures. However, it is not surprising that, in view
of the debate that has surrounded the patentability of DNA sequences having no known function, critics of the heightened Brenner standard have proposed other means for resolving the issue of
patentability for inventions related to recent developments in the
field of biotechnology.
In an effort to restore a lower utility standard, several opponents of the heightened Brenner standard have sought Congressional intervention. 71 In Kirk, for example, Judge Rich saw the
majority's improper extension of Brenner as demonstrating the
need for Congressional action to remove the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the utility requirement. 7' Judge Rich strongly

166. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
167. Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials 5 (2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf. "[TIhe credibility of.. .an

assertion [that nucleic acids could be used as probes, chromosome markers, or
forensic or diagnostic markers] would not be questioned, although such a use
might fail the specific and substantial tests." Id. "A claim to a polynucleotide
whose use is disclosed simply as a 'gene probe' or 'chromosome marker' would
not be considered to be specific in the absence of a disclosure of a specific DNA
target." Id. See Enserink, supra note 17, at 1197 (discussing the possible effects on DNA patentability of the Revised Utility Examination Guidelines).
168. Enserink, supra note 17, at 1196.
169. See Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 163, at 71441
(stating that the changes to the Revised Utility Examination Guidelines were
made as a result of comments submitted in response to the Utility Examination Guidelines,supra note 71, and directed to the issue of EST patentability).
170. Id. at 71441.
171. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 948, 957-58 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Adler, supra note
14, at 912, 913; Healy, supra note 18, at 667; Machin, supra note 78, at 44041; Byron v. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents for Gene Frag-

ments, and Licensing the "Useful Arts", 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 312, 32122, 333 (1997).

172. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 957-58 (asking that Congress enact a "statute which
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advocated a move towards a per se utility standard - especially for
chemical compounds that satisfy the remaining requirements for
patentability. 173 In the event that Congress refused to further delineate the boundaries of the utility requirement, Judge Rich
thought it critical that the Supreme Court provide further illumination regarding the meaning of the term "useful," specifically
with respect to inventions in the chemical arts. 74
Although several commentators followed Judge Rich's lead in
calling for Congress to reformulate the utility requirement,17' others sought a complete overhaul of the patent laws as they are applied to biotechnology. 7 6 Several commentators contend that as
Congress created separate intellectual property systems for plant
varieties and semiconductor chip masks, so too should Congress
create a biotechnology-specific system. 177 The USPTO, however,
has argued against the enactment of a new patent system for biotechnology, noting that the statutory requirement of novelty would
be rendered meaningless if Congress were to create a specialized
intellectual property system to address each new area of technology."7 Other commentators have suggested that issues related to

would restore the law to what it was for a century and a half").
173. See id. at 957-58 (arguing that an effective statute would specify that
"new and nonobvious chemical compounds" were per se useful within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. section 101 and that chemists would be presumed to
know how to use such compounds within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. section
112).
174. See id. at 948 (asking the Supreme Court to find patentable utility in
chemical compounds having any commercial value). But see Brenner, 383 U.S.
at 533 (determining that a de minimis utility standard "places such a special
meaning on the word 'useful' that we cannot accept it in the absence of evidence that Congress so intended").
175. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 14, at 912 (arguing that Congress should set
a lower utility hurdle); Machin, supra note 78, at 440-41 (arguing that the
Brenner utility standard "inefficiently promotes the progress of the useful arts
by insisting that each patented invention be useful in its current form," and
that Congress should therefore either eliminate the utility requirement altogether, enact a per se utility requirement, or restore "Judge Story's elegant
definition of utility"); Olsen, supra note 171, at 321 (contending that if the current patent laws do not support the patentability of DNA fragments having
possible use in the treatment of human disease, then the patent laws should
be changed to reflect the special nature of biotechnology).
176. Adler, supra note 14, at 913; Healy, supra note 18, at 667; Olsen, supra
note 171, at 333.
177. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 14, at 913 (arguing that a new intellectual
property system may be needed to encourage development of DNA sequence
inventions); Healy, supra note 18, at 667 (arguing that a new intellectual
property system may be needed for DNA sequences); Olsen, supra note 171, at
333 (arguing that Congress should amend the Patent Act to create a new biotechnology-specific provision).
178. See Doll, supra note 19, at 689 (noting that "in the USPTO's view, new
areas of technology do not create the need for a whole new specialized patent
law").
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DNA sequence patentability would be better resolved by requiring
researchers to seek copyright, rather than patent, protection for
newly identified DNA sequences.1 7 9
While many critics of the Brenner utility standard have
sought major revisions to the Patent Act (ranging from the elimination of the utility standard to the creation of an entirely new
patent system for biotechnology), less drastic statutory changes
have been suggested by those having no Brenner axe to grind. 8
One proposed change would alter the categories of statutory subject matter' 8' to change the way in which claims to "old" compositions of matter are examined.'82 While, under current patent law,
a claim to a new method of using an "old" composition may be pat83
entable, a claim to an "old" composition for a new use is not.
However, because claims to methods of use are more difficult to
enforce, such claims are not as desirable as those to compositions
of matter."& Thus, it has been suggested that the Patent Act be
179. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 14, at 913 (arguing that a registration sys-

tem for DNA sequences would be simpler and more affordable). But see S. M.
Thomas et al., Ownership of the Human Genome, 380 NATURE 387, 388 (1996)
(arguing that the enactment of a copyright system for DNA sequences would
be unrealistic and impractical, and that efforts should be made to restrict the
scope of DNA sequence patents so that one company cannot gain proprietary
rights over an entire gene and its mutations for all diagnostic and therapeutic
purposes).
180. See, e.g., Kiley, supra note 13, at 915-16 (arguing that an "old" DNA
fragment for which a function had not yet been assigned could be found to be
new by the discovery of its utility); Poste, supra note 18, at 535 (arguing for
compulsory licensing of patents directed to DNA sequences having significant
therapeutic or diagnostic utility).
181. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
182. See, e.g., Kiley, supra note 13, at 915-16 (arguing for the allowance of
claims to "old" compositions of matter for new methods of use).
183. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore.. ."). See In re
Thuau, 135 F.2d 344 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (stating that "it is clearly contrary to the
spirit [and] letter of the patent laws that patents should be granted for old
compositions of matter based upon new uses of such compositions where such
uses consist merely in the employment of such compositions"). The CCPA affirmed the Board's rejection of claims to metacresolsulfonic acid-aldehyde condensation products for use in treating cervicitis, cervical erosions, and related
ailments, since a person skilled in the art would know that that applicant's
products would have therapeutic properties. Id.
184. See Kiley, supra note 13, at 916 (stating that although method of treatment claims are believed to be less desirable than composition of matter
claims, "the cure - a grant to NIH of patents on thin grounds - may be worse
than the disease"). See also Adler, supra note 14, at 912-13 (noting that in
many countries, DNA sequence claims are allowable, but method of use claims
for human therapeutic and diagnostic methods involving DNA sequences are
not, and arguing for a strengthening of method of use claims internationally);
Healy, supra note 18, at 668 (arguing for a strengthening of method of use
claims internationally).
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modified to permit those who identify a new and non-obvious use
for an "old" DNA sequence (i.e., a use for which a patent has been
previously granted) to claim that DNA sequence for the new use."'
However, such a change to the Patent Act would, in all likelihood,
affect the value of claims to compositions of matter and lead to increased litigation between patentees holding patents to the same
composition (albeit for different uses).
As an alternative to Congressional modification of the Patent
Act, it has been suggested by one commentator that the issue of
EST patentability could be resolved by the application of a "prospective" utility requirement.'
Under this proposal, the Brenner
utility standard would be extended to encompass inventions "having a reasonable chance of being reasonably useful in the foreseeable future."187 However, since it would be difficult to refute an
applicant's assertion that an EST sequence would have a "reasonable chance of being reasonably useful in the foreseeable future,"
the "prospective" utility standard would have the same effect, in
practice, as a per se or de minimis utility standard.
In returning to the utility standard established in Brenner,
the Revised Utility Examination Guidelines constitute a step forward in the examination of inventions directed to DNA sequences
having no known function. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the
USPTO will raise the utility requirement bar with respect to
claims to DNA sequences having no known function as it begins to
examine patent applications directed to such subject matter.
Following an examination of the many proposals for addressing the perceived deficiencies in the utility requirement, however,
it becomes clear that only a strict adherence to the heightened
utility standard as set forth by the Supreme Court in Brenner will
confer upon the public the benefit of valuable invention disclosures. This is particularly true for inventions directed to DNA sequences having no known function, where a weakened utility requirement will result in patentees gaining limited monopolies for
disclosures lacking "substantial" utility. Furthermore, for patents
directed to ESTs, the public will be additionally harmed when the
function of a gene from which multiple ESTs were derived becomes
known and multiple patentees are permitted to extract licensing
fees from researchers who desire to use that gene. As the issue of
the patentability of DNA sequences having no function illustrates,
it is the heightened utility standard of Brenner that allows the
patent system to fulfill its ultimate purpose.

185. Kiley, supra note 13, at 915-16.
186. See Machin, supra note 78, at 451 (stating that the "prospective" utility
requirement will prevent "unfortunate holdings" like that in Brenner).
187. Machin, supra note 78, at 441.
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CONCLUSION

An inventor is entitled to patent protection only after the inventor has secured the "keys" to each of the "doors of sections 101,
102, and 103.""8 No inventor should be allowed to pass freely
through any of these "doors." When any one of the statutory requirements for patentability is weakened, the likelihood increases
that certain inventors (especially those seeking patent protection
for DNA sequences having no known function) will be able to secure overly broad patent rights. Thus, the patent system satisfies
its purpose of benefiting the public by securing valuable invention
disclosures only when each of the statutory requirements for patentability is given appropriate consideration.' 89 To fulfill the "quid
pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress," 9 ° the
USPTO should strictly adhere to the utility requirement as set
forth in Brenner. In proposing the Revised Utility Examination
Guidelines, the USPTO appears to be returning to the higher
Brenner standard and, thus, restoring the lock to the door of section 101. Inventors presenting claims to DNA sequences having
no known function should once again prepare to secure the key before being allowed to pass through this door.

188. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), affd sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).

189. See Machin, supra note 78, at 453 (noting that the requirements for
patentability are interrelated and that the utility requirement "does not operate in a vacuum").
190. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).

